YOUR A2 REVISION ROUTE
Revise A2 in four connected passes: identify network services and infrastructure, compare architecture choices, trace transmission, then judge protection. Explain a process aloud, recreate a worked example and check recall with the flashcards.
The SL/HL switch hides the five HL-only objectives: A2.1.5, A2.2.2, A2.3.4, A2.4.2 and A2.4.3. Other material is common to both levels. Device mapping remains in the common A2.1.3 notes; the full TCP/IP model treatment is labelled HL.
Flashcards can be filtered by section and marked for further learning. Your selected revision list retains all chosen cards, including cards hidden by a level or section filter, while the page remains open.
A2.1.1 | NETWORK PURPOSE AND SCOPE
A network connects participating systems so they can communicate and share resources. Benefits include shared services, collaboration and managed access; costs include equipment, administration, dependencies and exposure to security risks. A connection does not itself guarantee permission or availability.
A LAN serves a local setting, a WAN links networks across a wider area, and a PAN connects devices in a personal setting. Ownership, technologies and scale vary, so do not define every LAN as one room or every WAN as the internet. A VPN is a logical connection over another network, often providing a protected tunnel; it is not simply a fourth geographical size.
| Scenario | Reasoned identification |
|---|---|
| Laptop and nearby wearable | PAN: personal device connectivity |
| School building networks | LAN sections, potentially linked by a wider campus design |
| Organisation connects distant offices | WAN connectivity between sites |
| Staff uses a protected remote tunnel | VPN over the underlying connection |
A2.1.2 | DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURES WORK TOGETHER
The internet is interconnected network infrastructure; the WWW is a service using web resources and protocols over networks. Cloud computing offers managed, on-demand resources with responsibilities depending on the service. A distributed system spreads work across cooperating components. Edge computing places suitable processing near the data source or action. Mobile networks support connectivity for moving devices.
A smart traffic system can analyse a sensor locally for a prompt response and send summaries to cloud services for wider coordination. This can reduce dependence on a remote round trip for every action, but edge devices still need power, maintenance and security. Distribution adds coordination and consistency challenges; it does not automatically improve every task.
| Choice | Benefit to connect to the scenario | Limit to remember |
|---|---|---|
| Cloud | Shared scalable resources or managed services | Network, cost, configuration and provider dependencies |
| Edge | Nearby decisions and reduced upstream transfer | Limited local resources and dispersed management |
| Distributed processing | Work sharing or resilience under suitable design | Communication, state and partial-failure complexity |
| Mobile connectivity | Access while moving | Coverage, load, handover and radio conditions |
A2.1.3 | MATCH DEVICE FUNCTION TO THE JOB
| Device/function | Key role | Common TCP/IP mapping |
|---|---|---|
| NIC | Host access to the local link | Network interface |
| Basic Ethernet switch | Local frame forwarding using MAC information | Network interface |
| Wireless access point | Wireless link access and commonly LAN bridging | Network interface |
| Modem | Signalling conversion for a suitable access medium | Network interface / physical access functions |
| Router / default gateway | IP forwarding between networks | Internet |
| Protocol gateway | Interworking different protocols/representations | Depends on the translation, potentially application |
| Hardware firewall | Traffic policy enforcement | Depends on inspected fields, state and application capability |
One broadband box can combine several roles. A basic switch does not choose the full internet route, and a router is not responsible for interpreting every web page. Map the operation rather than assuming every product belongs to exactly one layer.
A2.1.4 | TRANSPORT AND APPLICATION PROTOCOLS
| Protocol | Describe its service | Avoid this confusion |
|---|---|---|
| TCP | Reliable ordered byte stream with recovery/control mechanisms | Does not itself encrypt data or preserve application write boundaries |
| UDP | Individual datagrams without built-in ordered reliable delivery | Higher layers can add recovery or security |
| HTTP | Web request/response meaning, methods and status | POST is not automatically encrypted |
| HTTPS | HTTP communication protected using TLS | Does not prove content/business honesty |
| DHCP | Host configuration and address lease management | Not DNS name lookup |
A common HTTP/1.1 or HTTP/2 arrangement uses TLS over TCP; HTTP/3 uses QUIC over UDP with additional transport/security mechanisms. The core comparison is each service’s role, not “UDP can never be reliable in any application”.
WORKED CHECK | DHCP IS NOT DNS
A laptop needs a new DHCPv4 allocation: Discover seeks a server, Offer proposes configuration, Request selects/requests it, and Acknowledgement confirms it under the protocol. An Offer alone is not a confirmed lease. Configuration can include address, subnet mask, gateway and a DNS resolver address.
DNS then answers name-related questions where needed. DHCP telling the laptop which resolver to use is different from DNS answering a query about portal.example. Valid existing leases, cached answers and established connections can be reused; not every page load repeats every setup exchange.
Explain the consequences: a DHCP outage may initially affect new allocations while a valid existing lease still works; an uncached name lookup can fail during a DNS outage even if the destination web service itself is healthy.
A2.1.5 | THE FOUR-LAYER TCP/IP MODEL HL ONLY
| Layer | Responsibility | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Application | Service-specific messages and meaning | HTTP, DNS, DHCP |
| Transport | Communication between software endpoints | TCP/UDP; logical ports |
| Internet | IP addressing and forwarding between networks | IP packets and router decisions |
| Network interface | Current link delivery and physical transmission | Ethernet/Wi-Fi frames and signals |
Sending uses lower-layer services and encapsulates carried data; receiving processes wrappers and passes data upward. TCP segment → IP packet → link frame is a useful teaching chain. A large page is not necessarily one packet.
IP is best effort. In a TCP case, endpoint sequence information, acknowledgements and retransmission support ordered reliable stream delivery. The four-layer model does not require TCP for every exchange or guarantee every transfer succeeds.
WORKED CHECK | ADDRESS, PORT AND LOCAL NEXT HOP
For a remote service, the host’s IP packet targets the service while its first Ethernet frame commonly targets the local router’s MAC address. A transport port helps identify the intended software endpoint. These are three different jobs.
At a normal routed boundary without NAT or tunnelling, endpoint IP addresses remain the same while link framing is replaced. Some IP fields change too, such as IPv4 TTL. Therefore “the packet is completely unchanged” and “the distant server’s MAC is used on every link” are both poor explanations.
A2.2.1 | STAR, MESH AND HYBRID
A switched star connects endpoints through a central switch. An endpoint cable fault normally isolates that endpoint, while a central switch failure interrupts communication through the star. A full mesh directly connects every pair in the considered set; a partial mesh provides selected interconnections. A hybrid combines arrangements, such as local stars with an interconnected core.
Alternative links help only when the remaining path is connected and forwarding mechanisms can use it. A hybrid’s redundant core does not repair an endpoint’s only failed cable. Redundancy must consider shared power, routes and equipment.
| Factor | Useful comparison |
|---|---|
| Reliability | Identify actual dependencies and usable alternatives |
| Transmission speed | Rates, shared links, devices and load matter; no universal winner |
| Scalability | Star port/capacity limits versus steep full-mesh connection growth |
| Collisions | Full-duplex switched Ethernet avoids normal collisions; hubs/wireless differ |
| Cost | Include installation, ports, maintenance and expertise |
WORKED CHECK | MESH GROWTH AND A BOTTLENECK
A full mesh of six nodes needs 6 × 5 ÷ 2 = 15 two-way point-to-point links. Each node has five links. Adding a seventh node needs six additional links, giving 21. Division by two avoids counting A–B and B–A as separate physical connections in this model.
Twenty computers can each have 1 Gbit/s access links yet still compete for one 1 Gbit/s uplink to a shared service. The topology does not create unlimited capacity. Queueing or drops on full-duplex Ethernet can reflect congestion without normal Ethernet collisions.
For a campus, explain why manageable star access and selectively resilient core links may balance cost and availability better than a direct connection between every pair of laptops.
A2.2.2 | SIX SERVER ROLES HL ONLY
| Role | Function | Important management concern |
|---|---|---|
| DNS | Answer name-related queries | Cache limits, trusted records and service availability |
| DHCP | Manage configuration and leases | Adequate pools and coordinated failover |
| File | Provide network files/folders | Permissions, storage performance and recoverable backups |
| Submit, transfer and store messages | Queues, mailbox capacity and safe account/relay policy | |
| Proxy | Intermediation for clients or backend services | Correct policy and private/public cache handling |
| Web | Handle HTTP requests/responses | Application/database dependencies and access controls |
For each role compare function, scalability, reliability and security. A service can span hosts or share one host with other roles. Replication and redundant storage are not substitutes for protected historical backups.
A forward proxy acts for clients; a reverse proxy fronts services. SMTP supports submission/transfer; IMAP supports mailbox access. A certificate or permitted port does not prove all application content is safe.
A2.2.3 | CLIENT-SERVER VERSUS PEER-TO-PEER
Both models support network resource use. Client-server assigns provision to designated services. P2P participants can provide as well as consume resources. Models describe roles; star and mesh describe connection arrangements. A P2P application can operate over a physical star.
Client-server can simplify common policy, authoritative records and backups, but service dependencies need capacity and recovery planning. P2P can distribute provision and avoid a dedicated content host, but availability depends on reachable peers with the needed data, and coordination/trust remain necessary.
A web request or mailbox access is commonly client-server. File sharing can use either model. VoIP can combine central signalling and direct peer media; blockchain nodes may exchange P2P while a wallet uses a central API. Classify the specified interaction.
| Factor | Client-server | P2P |
|---|---|---|
| Control | Common designated service policy | Potentially distributed policy/coordination |
| Growth | Provision service and dependent capacity | New peers can add capacity and demand |
| Failure | Single service without failover can interrupt access | Last usable copy going offline can remove a resource |
| Security | Central controls help but central compromise matters | Distributed trust and endpoint controls still needed |
A2.2.4 | SEGMENTATION, SUBNETS AND VLANS
Segmentation is the broader design of smaller sections and boundaries. A VLAN creates a logical Layer 2 LAN/broadcast domain on switching infrastructure. Subnetting divides IP address space using prefixes. A common design pairs one subnet with one VLAN, but their functions are distinct.
Access ports commonly attach endpoints to one data VLAN; trunks can carry multiple VLANs while preserving membership. A router, Layer 3 switch or suitable firewall supplies inter-VLAN routing. Routing makes a path possible; ACL/firewall policy controls which paths are permitted.
A student broadcast is not normally bridged into the staff VLAN, reducing irrelevant local traffic. Shared uplinks and internet capacity remain shared. A VLAN is not encryption and does not automatically prevent guest-to-guest communication without additional controls.
WORKED CHECK | SPLIT A /24 AND CONTROL A PATH
| Block | Ordinary IPv4 interface range | Directed broadcast |
|---|---|---|
| 192.168.10.0/25 | 192.168.10.1–126 | 192.168.10.127 |
| 192.168.10.128/25 | 192.168.10.129–254 | 192.168.10.255 |
Each example has 128 total addresses, with 126 ordinary interface positions after excluding network/broadcast; a gateway consumes one such position. .126 and .129 are in different /25 subnets even though the first three decimal numbers match.
If student and service subnets occupy separate VLANs, a permitted HTTPS route can connect them while guest-to-service access is denied. The original student Layer 2 broadcast does not become a broadcast in every destination VLAN. A DHCP relay may be needed to reach a DHCP service outside the client’s broadcast domain.
A2.3.1 | VERSION, SCOPE AND ASSIGNMENT
IPv4 addresses have 32 bits and commonly use four decimal octets, each 0–255. IPv6 has 128 bits and full notation uses eight hexadecimal groups. Leading zeros inside IPv6 groups can be omitted, and one zero run can use ::. 2001:db8::24 expands to 2001:0db8:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0024.
Public/private scope and static/dynamic assignment are independent. A private printer address may be static while a private laptop address is leased dynamically. A provider can allocate a public address statically or dynamically. Repeatedly receiving the same address does not prove static configuration.
Private IPv4 ranges are 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12 and 192.168.0.0/16. Not all 172 addresses are private, and not every non-private address is ordinary public unicast: loopback and documentation ranges are examples of special use.
WORKED CHECK | NAPT AND IPV6 SCOPE
| Internal TCP endpoint | Illustrative translated external endpoint |
|---|---|
| 192.168.10.24:51000 | 203.0.113.8:62001 |
| 192.168.10.25:51000 | 203.0.113.8:62002 |
NAPT translates addresses and ports, letting internal connections share external IPv4 addressing. The separate external ports select the illustrated return mappings. This conserves public IPv4 use; it does not create more 32-bit patterns or encrypt content. 203.0.113.8 is a reserved documentation example, not a live public address.
IPv6 includes global unicast, link-local fe80::/10 and unique-local fc00::/7 categories. It can use automatic configuration such as SLAAC as well as other supported arrangements. Its large space reduces address-conservation NAT need, but neither removes firewall policy nor guarantees every application is faster.
A2.3.2 | COMPARE TRANSMISSION MEDIA
| Factor | Twisted pair | Fibre optic | Wireless |
|---|---|---|---|
| Signal | Electrical over paired copper | Light through an optical path | Radio in the Wi-Fi examples |
| Capacity/range | Depends on category/standard; many office channels up to 100 m | Suitable optics/fibre support high-capacity long links | Depends strongly on technology, environment and shared airtime |
| Installation/cost | Routes, terminations and tests; often economical locally | Compatible optics, clean connectors and sometimes specialist handling | Coverage/channel planning, AP power and backhaul |
| Interference/attenuation | Electrical noise and losses; twists/shielding help | Optical path immune to EMI, but optical loss exists | Path loss, obstructions and competing transmissions |
| Reliability/security | Predictable within limits; protect cable/ports and data | Physical/optical faults still matter; not untappable or encrypted by default | Mobility benefit; needs sufficient coverage and strong wireless protection |
Bandwidth/capacity is not achieved throughput; latency is delay; attenuation is signal weakening. A campus may choose copper for nearby fixed PCs, fibre for a 250 m inter-building backbone and wireless for moving tablets. Explain why each choice fits instead of declaring one medium universally best.
A2.3.3 | PACKET SWITCHING AS A CONNECTED PROCESS
Application data is carried in suitable units, with control information supporting delivery. In a TCP example, segments are carried by IP packets and local link frames. IP addressing supports forwarding, while TCP has separate byte sequence, endpoint and recovery information.
Local switches forward frames within the relevant VLAN. Routers use destination IP and installed forwarding information to select successive next hops. Different transfers share links, so packets may queue or be lost. Paths can differ, but packets of one flow often follow the same stable path.
At the destination, TCP can reconstruct an ordered byte stream and recover missing ranges where possible. IP itself is best effort, and UDP applications do not inherit TCP recovery automatically. IP fragment reassembly is a separate mechanism from TCP stream ordering.
WORKED CHECK | OUT-OF-ORDER BYTES
| Observed arrival | TCP contiguous bytes available | Later bytes waiting |
|---|---|---|
| NET at relative bytes 0–2 | NET | None |
| KS! at relative bytes 6–8 | NET | KS! |
| WOR at relative bytes 3–5 | NETWORKS! | None |
The receiver uses byte-position information rather than blindly joining arrival order. If WOR is lost, recovery is needed before the gap is filled; a later retransmission may provide it. The labels are teaching offsets, not a universal packet-number field in IP.
Acknowledgements report transport progress, not proof that a document was saved or a payment completed. An unrecoverable failure can still break a TCP connection.
A2.3.4 | STATIC AND DYNAMIC ROUTING HL ONLY
Static routes are explicit administrator-defined instructions for destination prefixes and next hops. Dynamic routing uses configured protocol exchanges and selection rules to learn/update routes. Both feed installed forwarding; neither asks a human or reruns a complete route exchange for each application packet.
Static can suit a small stable single-exit section with little protocol overhead, but remote changes can require manual maintenance. Dynamic learning often helps a changing multipath campus, but adds configuration complexity, update traffic, state and calculation work.
Convergence includes detection, information changes, route selection and forwarding updates. It takes time and can lose in-flight traffic. Dynamic does not always mean fastest, and basic static routes do not automatically discover every alternate path. Configured tracking/backup can change static behaviour.
WORKED CHECK | ROUTE MATCH AND FAILURE HL ONLY
| Installed destination | Instruction |
|---|---|
| 10.20.0.0/16 | Via R2 |
| 10.20.30.0/24 | Via R3 |
| 0.0.0.0/0 | Via R5 |
10.20.30.8 uses the more-specific /24 instruction, while 10.20.99.8 uses /16. Prefix specificity is distinct from comparing metrics among candidate routes.
If a remote R2–R4 link fails while R1 can still reach R2, a static instruction without tracking/backup may keep sending toward a broken path until changed. Dynamic learning can select an available permitted alternative after convergence. Correct return routes and policy are still required.
Compare configuration, maintenance, complexity, resource usage, convergence, scalability and network size; static and dynamic can coexist.
A2.4.1 | FIREWALL EFFECTIVENESS
Firewalls enforce traffic policy using available fields, connection state and supported inspection features. Allowlists/whitelists identify approved paths; blocklists/blacklists identify denied items. A first-match ruleset needs careful ordering because a broad early permit can shadow a later deny.
Stateful inspection can validate return traffic for an allowed connection without opening arbitrary inbound access. An ACK flag alone does not prove a trusted reply. Outbound filtering also matters, but allowed paths may still carry harmful data.
Strengths include reduced reachability, consistent boundary policy and useful logs. Limits include bypassed internal paths, allowed/hidden threats, false decisions, misconfiguration and finite capacity. Large upstream saturation may need upstream mitigation. NAT can reduce straightforward unsolicited reachability in common IPv4 sharing but is not encryption or a complete firewall policy.
WORKED CHECK | DISCUSS A FIREWALL PROPOSAL
A school permits HTTPS browsing but denies guest-to-staff connections. Explain the benefit: required learning works while unnecessary targets are less reachable. Then state the limit: a permitted encrypted site can still deceive a user or serve harmful content, and local traffic bypassing the perimeter is not inspected there.
A supported judgement is that a properly placed and maintained firewall is an important access-control layer, combined with patching, MFA, endpoint security, safe applications, training and recovery. A valid policy depends on reviewed exceptions, useful monitoring and capacity, not simply owning a firewall.
Use “discuss” to develop strengths and limitations in context and reach a reasoned conclusion, rather than only defining packet filtering.
A2.4.2 | VULNERABILITIES AND ATTACK MECHANISMS HL ONLY
| Concept | Defining feature |
|---|---|
| DDoS | Distributed demand exhausts service or supporting resources |
| Insecure protocols | Communication lacks necessary confidentiality/integrity/authentication |
| Malware | Software performs harmful or unauthorised activity |
| MitM | Unauthorised intermediary can interfere where protections fail |
| Phishing | Deception induces disclosure or unsafe action |
| SQL injection | Input alters database instructions through a vulnerable application |
| XSS | Untrusted content executes in browser site context |
| Unpatched software | Applicable available fixes have not been installed |
| Weak authentication | Inadequate identity checks or credentials |
| Zero-day exploit | Uses a previously unknown/unfixed flaw with little preparation opportunity |
A vulnerability is a weakness; an exploit uses one; an attack is an attempt at harm. A symptom such as slowness is not conclusive proof. Describe mechanism, processing location and a plausible confidentiality, integrity or availability impact.
WORKED CHECK | INJECTION, IDENTITY AND PATCH STATUS HL ONLY
SQL injection concerns unsafe database instruction construction. XSS concerns browser execution in a trusted site context. Both mishandle untrusted data but require context-specific defences. Not every textbox containing SQL words proves injection, and not every XSS can read every cookie.
Phishing can lead to malware and credential theft, but the terms identify different stages. MitM concerns an unauthorised path intermediary, not simply a convincing message. Correctly authenticated TLS resists relevant interception; it does not make a phishing site honest.
A known flaw with an available unapplied fix differs from a previously unknown/unfixed zero-day situation. Authentication checks identity; authorisation controls actions. A legitimate user reading forbidden records may indicate faulty authorisation rather than weak login.
A2.4.3 | COUNTERMEASURES BY PURPOSE HL ONLY
| Control | Function and limit |
|---|---|
| CSP | Browser resource/execution policy; complements safe rendering |
| Password policy / MFA | Long unique credentials and different factor types; secure recovery matters |
| DDoS mitigation | Filter/absorb demand at useful locations; classification/capacity limits remain |
| Email filtering | Reject/quarantine/warn on suspicious evidence; can miss deception |
| Encrypted protocols / certificates | Protect and authenticate connection endpoints; not business honesty |
| Input validation | Check allowed data requirements; also use parameterised SQL and safe output handling |
| IDS / IPS | Detect and alert / preventive action under policy; false decisions possible |
| Updates | Deploy/verify fixes; not every future flaw disappears |
| VPN | Protect a defined tunnel; onward paths and endpoints still need controls |
| Wireless security | Strong supported authentication/encryption; MAC lists are limited |
| Testing / training | Authorised checks, remediation/retesting and safe verification/reporting |
SSL is an obsolete protocol family; “SSL certificate” is still a common label for certificates used with modern TLS. MAC filtering means Media Access Control addresses, which can be imitated or randomised; an address list is not strong identity assurance.
WORKED CHECK | DETECTION IS NOT AUTOMATIC PREVENTION HL ONLY
A passive IDS flags suspicious traffic and alerts without automatically blocking the original exchange. An inline IPS can drop flagged traffic under its policy. If a benign exchange is falsely flagged, the IPS can interrupt legitimate work; if harmful traffic is missed, neither model’s detector triggers the intended response.
MFA needs different factor types, not two passwords. Parameterised queries separate SQL structure and values, whereas validation checks data requirements and output encoding prevents unintended browser interpretation. A VPN protects between its endpoints, not every possible path.
Modern password guidance emphasises length, uniqueness and rejecting compromised/common choices rather than arbitrary composition or routine changes without a reason. Training and testing must feed real improvements rather than a one-time checklist.
A2.4.4 | SYMMETRIC, ASYMMETRIC AND SIGNATURE ROLES
| Goal | Appropriate key relationship |
|---|---|
| Symmetric protection | Shared secret key relationships; traffic may use derived directional keys |
| Encrypt for Bob in a suitable public-key scheme | Bob’s public encryption key encrypts; Bob’s private key decrypts |
| Alice signs specified data | Alice’s private signing key signs; her public verification key verifies |
| Authenticate a public-key binding | Certificate and relevant trust/name/signature checks |
| Modern authenticated key establishment | Key agreement plus authentication derives traffic secrets |
Algorithms specify procedures; keys control operations. Encoding such as Base64 is not secrecy, and hashing is not reversible encryption. A signature does not hide the message and is not universally “private-key encryption”. Not all public-key algorithms support the same roles.
WORKED CHECK | CERTIFICATE TO SECURE TRAFFIC
A certificate publicly binds identity information and a public key, with issuer/validity/other fields protected by a signature. The client checks the requested name, acceptable trust path, time and relevant constraints/status requirements. The server must prove control of the associated private key; copying its public certificate is insufficient.
In a fresh modern certificate-authenticated ephemeral TLS key-agreement example, exchange information and authentication support deriving traffic keys. Symmetric authenticated encryption then protects application traffic. Do not claim every modern TLS connection sends a session key encrypted with the certificate key.
Validated TLS protects its connection endpoints, not business honesty, every user action or every onward connection. Private keys are not inside public certificates, and authentication does not replace authorisation.
A2.4.4 | KEY LIFECYCLE AND PROTECTION BOUNDARIES
Key management covers secure generation, authenticated establishment, controlled storage/use, replacement, recovery where justified and retirement. Publicly leaking a private or shared secret can defeat a sound algorithm. Losing the only storage-decryption key can make records unrecoverable.
Compromise response can include replacing keys/certificates, revocation under the relevant system and investigation. Renewal and key rotation are not identical. Suitable ephemeral protocols can provide forward secrecy, but this does not undo stolen plaintext or endpoint compromise.
Encryption in transit protects an exchange; at rest protects stored representations. Both may use similar algorithm families but have different scope and key-management needs. Database encryption does not automatically prevent misuse through an authorised query account.
COMMON MISTAKES | CONNECT THE DISTINCTIONS
| Confusion | Useful correction |
|---|---|
| Internet / WWW | Infrastructure / web service |
| DHCP / DNS | Host configuration / name information |
| Switch / router | Local frame forwarding / IP network forwarding |
| Topology / model | Connections / service-provider roles |
| Subnet / VLAN | IP prefix / logical Layer 2 LAN |
| Dynamic IP / dynamic routing | Address assignment / route learning |
| Bandwidth / throughput | Capacity / useful achieved rate |
| IP delivery / TCP recovery | Best effort / transport ordering and recovery |
| NAT / firewall | Translation / traffic permission policy |
| Public certificate / private key | Distributable signed binding / protected secret |
| Encryption / authorisation | Protection of representations/exchanges / permitted actions |
EXAM COMMUNICATION | USE THE COMMAND WORD
Describe: give main features and roles, using precise examples. Explain: state how a mechanism causes an outcome using because, therefore or resulting in. Compare: use the same factor for alternatives and identify relevant similarities/differences. Discuss: develop strengths and limits in context, then reach a supported judgement.
For topology, media and routing questions, explicitly cover the factors named in the objective. For a process, identify where each step occurs rather than attributing every action to “the network”. Recreate worked examples before checking notes, then select flashcards for the ideas you cannot explain unaided.